The Death Penalty in Virginia: Attempts at Legislative Reform by Elgie, Tara
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA: ATTEMPTS AT
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Tara Elgie
APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EARL WASHINGTON, JR.
CASE
On February 12, 2001, Earl Washington, Jr. was released from
prison-eighteen years after he was wrongly convicted of raping and
stabbing a nineteen-year-old woman and sentenced to death. At one
point during his prison term, Washington came within nine days of
execution. 139 Washington was sentenced to death in March of 1984,
after a jury convicted him of raping and repeatedly stabbing Rebecca
Lynn Williams in the bedroom of her apartment, a capital murder
offense. 140 Washington, who has an I.Q. of approximately 69, confessed
to the murder no fewer than three times and was convicted on the basis
of these confessions, as well as his admission to owning a shirt that was
linked to the crime scene. 141
The confessions were elicited after Washington was arrested for
breaking into the house of an elderly neighbor while drunk, stealing a
gun, and using that gun to shoot his brother in the foot. 142 Upon his
arrest in those incidents, Washington was questioned about Williams'
murder. 143 He confessed to the crime, but his confession contained
errors, and at trial he pled not guilty and denied having confessed to the
murder, stating that the attorneys were lying. 144 His lawyers would later
argue that the police asked leading questions, and fed him the details of
the Williams murder during their questioning to elicit those
confessions. 145
At the time of the trial, DNA technology was not available to test
139. Frank Green, Washington Released: Former Death Row Inmate Thanks Supporters on First Day
Out, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Feb. 13, 2001, at B1.
140. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535 (1984).
141. Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1286, 1286 (4th Cir. 1993).
142. See Green, supra note 1, atB1.
143. Washington v. Commonwealth at 542-43.
144. Id. at 543.
145. Id.
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seminal fluid stains from a blanket found in Williams' bedroom. 146 In
1993, the Virginia Attorney General's office approved DNA testing in
the case for five seminal fluid stains found on the blanket.1 47
Washington's first habeas petition was dismissed without a hearing, but
on remand the district court considered forensic evidence relating to the
five seminal fluid stains.1 48 Based on conflicting scientific testimony
regarding the DNA evidence, the court ruled that it was inconclusive,
since it could not be determined whether the stains were pure seminal
fluid.149 However, the court noted that if the stains were pure seminal
fluid, then neither Washington, nor Williams' husband, could have left
them.1 50 Such evidence that the seminal fluid belonged to neither
Washington nor Williams would suggest the presence of a third party in
the room, thereby raising doubt as to Washington's guilt.
In 1994, based on DNA which suggested that Washington was not the
assailant, then-Governor L. Douglas Wilder commuted Washington's
sentence to life in prison.1 51 In 2000, Washington's lawyers asked
Governor Jim Gilmore for additional DNA testing, arguing that
improved technology might be able to establish Washington's guilt or be
used to exonerate him.152 In October 2000, Gilmore announced that
further DNA testing had found no trace of Washington at the crime
scene, but rather implicated a convicted rapist already in prison.1 53
Having determined that a jury might have reached a different verdict if
they had been presented with this evidence, Gilmore issued an absolute
pardon to Washington.1 54
Washington could be exonerated only by the Governor through
clemency proceedings, not by the courts, because of Virginia's so-called
21-day rule.1 55 This rule states that "all final judgments, orders, and
decrees, irrespective of terms of the court... [are] subject to be modified,
vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and
no longer.1156 In essence, as happened with Earl Washington, Jr., this
146. See Green, supra note 1, atB1.
147. Id.
148. Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1993).
149. Id. at 1288.
150. Id.
151. Green, supra note 1, atB1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Va. R. S. Ct. Rule 1:1.
156. Id.
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rule precludes the introduction of new evidence post- conviction, even if
that evidence may entirely exculpate the defendant.
This paper will argue that the time has come for legislative reform of
capital punishment. It will briefly examine the history of the death
penalty, focusing on the provisions under which it was reinstated and
whether those provisions are met under today's implementation. Then
it will look to recent attempts by the Virginia General Assembly to
reform the procedures by which it implements the death penalty. The
paper will also explore public perception of the death penalty as an
explanation for why the death penalty persists as the ultimate
punishment, despite recent problems with its implementation.
A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The death penalty was abolished in the United States in 1972 when
the Supreme Court found the practice of the death penalty to be
constitutionally unacceptable, because it was implemented in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.157 In his concurring opinion in this case, Justice
Douglas concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional because
of its discriminatory application, and stated that it is "cruel and unusual
to apply the death penalty selectively to minorities whose numbers are
few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom
society is willing to see suffer. ' 158 Moreover, Justice White, in his
concurrence, stated that a major goal of the criminal law is to deter
others by punishing the convicted criminal, but that such purpose is lost
in a system where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceased to
influence the conduct of others. 159
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled that
the concerns expressed in Furman regarding the arbitrary and capricious
manner in which the death penalty was imposed had been rectified by
legislative reform in Georgia.160 In Gregg, the Court found that
sentencing discretion "must be suitably directed and limited so as to
157. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (holding that "the imposition and carrying out of the
death sentence in the present cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.").
158. Id. at245.
159. Id. at312.
160. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 161 The
Court went on to find that Georgia had effectively eliminated the
randomness from death sentencing by imposing a bifurcated sentencing
procedure, ensuring that specific factors were considered when imposing
the death penalty, and by providing meaningful appellate review. 162
ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA
The Georgia legislature may have effectively revised its death penalty
procedures to ensure that death sentences are not "imposed capriciously
or in a freakish manner"; 163 however, there is evidence that Virginia's
procedures, especially in the realm of appellate review, are arbitrary and
capricious. Widely publicized death penalty cases, like the Washington
case, have led to calls on the Virginia General Assembly to modify the
21-day rule. In a state ranking second only to Texas in the number of
convicted criminals executed since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976,164 bills making it harder for Virginia to execute prisoners do not
pass the General Assembly easily. Approximately seventeen different
bills potentially impacting implementation of capital punishment in
Virginia were introduced in the General Assembly during the 2001
session. 165 Of those, only three were approved. 166
Proposing a Death Penalty Moratorium
Four separate bills introduced by the Virginia General Assembly in the
2001 term proposed issuing a moratorium on executions pending a study
by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) on the
process and administration of the death penalty in Virginia. 167 None of
161. Id. at 189.
162. Id. at 190-195.
163. Id. at 195.
164. Jim Oliphant, Dateline: Northern Va., LEGAL BUS., Feb. 24, 2000, at 20.
165. See supra notes 28, 29, 35, 37, 55-60 and accompanying text.
166. See H.B. 1366, Storage and testing of certain evidence, writ of actual innocence, Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (approved by Gov. Gilmore, May 2, 2001, Chapter 873, effective May 2, 2001);
H.B. 2580, Counsel in capital cases, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (approved by Gov. Gilmore
Mar. 26, 2001, Chapter 766, effective Jan. 1, 2002); H.B. 2802, Criminal procedure; retention of
evidence, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (approved by Gov. Gilmore May 2, 2001, Chapter 875,
effective July 1, 2001).
167. See S.B. 1135, Executions of prisoners; moratorium, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (Senate:
Failed to report (defeated) in Courts of Justice Committee, Feb. 4, 2001); H.B. 2764, Executions of
prisoners; moratorium, Gen. Assm., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (House: Passed by indefinitely in Courts of
38
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
those bills passed this session. The text of these bills was virtually
identical, the text of the summary as introduced reads as follows:
... [T]he Commonwealth shall not conduct any
executions of prisoners sentenced to death until July 1
[2001] following the JLARC study on the death penalty.
The bill is a suspension of executions only. All other
matters of law related to the death penalty, including the
bringing and trying of capital charges, sentencing
proceedings, imposing the death sentence, appeals, and
habeas review are not affected. 168
In the preambles to the execution moratorium bills, the patrons
recognize that imposition of the death penalty is the ultimate
penalty. 169 The bills also indicate that questions have arisen about the
disparity, fairness, equity, and due process requirements when the death
penalty was imposed. 170 Furthermore, the patrons note in these bills that
Earl Washington, Jr. was convicted and twice scheduled to be executed,
but later shown to be innocent and granted an absolute pardon for capital
murder.171 For all those reasons, the patrons state that a thorough
review of the process is necessary, that a final report based on a study by
JLARC is expected to be submitted to the General Assembly in late
2001, and urge in the meantime that executions be suspended. 172
Three separate execution moratorium bills were introduced in the
house and ultimately merged into one, H.B. 2764, introduced by
Delegate Almand. 173 On February 1, 2001, the House Courts of Justice
committee passed down H.B. 2764 indefinitely. 174
In addition to the aforementioned execution moratorium bills,
Delegate Hargrove introduced H.B. 1827, which would abolish the death
Justice Committee, Feb. 1,2001); H.B. 2664, Executions of prisoners; moratorium, Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2001) (House: Incorporated by Courts of Justice Committee (HB2764) Feb. 1, 2001); H.B.
2799, Executions of prisoners; moratorium, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (House: Incorporated
by Courts of Justice Committee (HB2764) Feb. 1, 2001) ("the execution moratorium bills"), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/011/bil.hm.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See H.B. 2799, H.B. 2664, and H.B. 2764, supra note 29.
174. H.B. 2764, supra note 29.
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penalty for Class 1 felonies committed after July 1, 2001.175 This bill
would replace the death penalty with a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for Class 1 felonies. 176 The bill would
not be retroactive, and therefore leaves intact the majority of death
penalty statutes for the prosecution or appeal of a death sentence
occurring prior to the change in law. 177 H.B. 1827 was passed by
indefinitely by the House Courts of Justice Committee on February 1,
2001.178
Abolishing the 21-Day Rule in Virginia
The 21-day rule is a legislative limit on evidentiary appeals. This rule
has been widely criticized in Virginia, and for several years legislation
aimed at extending or abolishing the time limit for evidentiary appeals
have been introduced in the General Assembly. 179 In 2000, a bill
proposed by Delegate Almand to extend the evidentiary appeal limit to
three years was met at first with widespread support, passing the House
by a 73-25 margin, but failed to pass in 2000 after Governor Gilmore
vowed to veto the bill. 180 However, perhaps in response to the publicity
that the 21-day rule received in connection with the Earl Washington,
Jr. case, the 2001 General Assembly successfully introduced legislation
aimed at reforming the 21-day rule. On May 2, 2001, Governor Gilmore
signed S.B. 1366. This legislation establishes a procedure for the storage,
preservation and retention of human biological evidence in felony cases
and had broad support within the General Assembly this session. 181 The
legislation also establishes a procedure for a convicted felon to petition
the circuit court that entered the conviction to apply for a new
scientific investigation of human biological evidence. 182 However, before
the court will allow testing, five provisions must be met:
(i) the evidence was not known or available at the
time the conviction became final or not previously
tested because the testing procedure was not available at
175. H.B. 1827, Death Penalty, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (House: Passed by indefinitely in
Courts of Justice Committee, Feb. 1,2001), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/011/bil.htm.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Oliphant, supra note 26.
180. Id.
181. S.B. 1366, supra note 28.
182. Id.
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the Division of Forensic Science at the time; (ii) the
chain of custody establishes that the evidence has not
been altered, tampered with, or substituted, (iii) the
testing is materially relevant, noncumulative, and
necessary and may prove the convicted person's actual
innocence; (iv) the testing requested involves a scientific
method employed by the Division of Forensic Science;
and (v) the convicted person did not unreasonably delay
the filing of the petition after the evidence or the test
for the evidence became available.183
Additionally, the petition must state not only the reasons why the
evidence was not known or tested by the time the conviction became
final, but also why the newly discovered or untested evidence may prove
the actual innocence of the person convicted. 184 SB 1366 is the result of
collaborative effort between state legislators, notably Senator Stolle who
introduced the bill, and a special force created by the Virginia State
Crime Commission.1 85 The special force, lead by Stolle, consists of
defense attorneys, prosecutors, legislators of both parties, and capital
punishment supporters and opponents. 186 The bill enjoyed widespread
support from the legislators, but it also has its critics. 187
For example, opponents argue that SB 1366 sets the standards for
admitting new evidence too high and allows evidence to be destroyed
after the inmate has been executed. 188 Furthermore, opponents argue
that the bill is too restrictive because it only applies to scientific
evidence, while other evidence is still subject to the 21-day rule. 189 Such
opponents argue that DNA evidence supports a small number of death
row cases and only eliminating the 21-day rule will effectuate meaningful
death penalty reform in Virginia. 190 The director of Virginians for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty notes that of ninety-three former
death row inmates, only ten had DNA evidence to exonerate them, the
rest were cleared only when witnesses changed their stories or trial errors
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Frank Green, Death Penalty Foes Rap Bill; They Say '21-Day Rule' Measure is Deficient, RICH.
TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Jan. 29, 2001, at B1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Henry Heller, Director, Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty).
189. Id. (citing Heller and Kent Willis, Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia).
190. Id.
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were found.191 SB 1366 would not have helped those death row inmates.
According to these opponents, only a bill that allows a person to step
forward at any time with any evidence of innocence, DNA or otherwise,
will be acceptable.1 92
Other Death Penalty Reform Bills in Virginia
Two other capital punishment reform bills of note were passed during
the 2001 session and signed into lawby Governor Gilmore. (1) HB 2580,
introduced by Delegate McDonnell, directs the Supreme Court of
Virginia and the Public Defender Commission to develop standards and a
list of capital-qualified attorneys to represent both indigent and non-
indigent defendants.1 93 (2) HB 2802 requires that any human biological
evidence, including fingerprinting, chemical analysis, blood or DNA
analysis, used in a felony trial wherein the defendant is convicted must,
upon motion by the defendant, be retained for fifteen years, and if the
person is sentenced to death shall be kept until the judgment is
executed. 194
However, many other capital reform bills were introduced and
defeated this session. Included in that set was: a bill that would allow
juries on death penalty cases to be informed that there was an individual
sentenced to death in the Commonwealth who was twice scheduled to be
executed and who was later granted an absolute pardon on the basis of
DNA testing;1 95 a joint resolution directing the Crime Commission to
study the feasibility of creating a system in which innocent people
convicted of crimes and incarcerated may recover damages;1 96 a joint
resolution to establish a joint subcommittee to study the need for a
moratorium on death sentence executions; 97 and a bill allowing for
191. Id. (citing Heller).
192. Id. (citing Willis).
193. H.B. 2580, Counsel in capital cases, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (approved by Governor
Gilmore, Mar. 26, 2001, Chapter 766, effective Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/011/bil.hm.
194. H.B. 2802, Criminal Procedure; retention of evidence, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001)
(Approved by Governor Gilmore, May 2, 2001, Chapter 875 effective July 1, 2001), available at
http://leg1.state.va.us/011/bil.hltm.
195. H.B. 1590, Capital Murder, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (passed by indefinitely in House
Courts of Justice Committee, Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://legl.state.va.us/011/bil.htm.
196. H. Joint Res. 630, Study; compensation for wrongly convicted persons, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2001) (passed by indefinitely in the House Rules Committee, Feb. 4, 2001), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/011/bil.hltm.
197. H. Joint Res. 508, Study; death penalty, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (tabled in House
42
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post-conviction testing of biological material for DNA for the purpose
of establishing innocence. 198
PUBLIC OPINION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The large number of bills addressing capital punishment that were
introduced in the 2001 session indicates that the Virginia General
Assembly is concerned about how the state is implementing the death
penalty. Despite widely publicized incidents of failures in death penalty
implementation, like the Earl Washington, Jr. case, public support for
the death penalty remains fairly strong. A Gallup Poll survey conducted
in February, 2001, indicates that 67% of Americans favor the death
penalty, while 25% are opposed. 199 However, public support has been on
a downward trend since 1994, when public support for the death penalty
peaked at 80%.200 Likewise, in Virginia, 75% still favor capital
punishment, but that number is down from 80% in 1997.201 Yet when
posed with "the alternative of a life sentence without the possibility of
parole," 45% would agree with eliminating the death penalty; women
(51% versus 38% for men) are most supportive of this alternative. 20 2
Furthermore, polls indicate that 74% of Virginians oppose the 21-day
rule. 203 This indicates they are unsatisfied with Virginia's current
implementation of the death penalty.
In March 1972, the last Gallup Poll survey prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia, public support of the death penalty
was 50% with 41% opposed. 20 4 By 1976, when the Court reinstituted the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, public support for the death penalty
had risen to 66% with 26% opposed. 20 5 Thus, Gallup Poll surveys seem
Rules Committee, Feb. 4, 2001), available at http://legl.state.va.us/011/bil.hm.
198. H.B. 2349, Innocence Protection Act of 2001 (testing material for DNA), Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2001) (tabled in House Courts of Justice Committee, Feb. 1, 2001), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/Ol1/bil.htm.
199. Gallup Poll, Two-Thirds of Americans Support the Death Penalty (March 2, 2001),
www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010302.asp (last visited, Sept.16, 2001) (hereinafter Gallup Poll).
200. Id.
201. Alan E. Bayer & Susan M. Willis-Walton, Quality of Life in Virginia: 2000 (Research Design
and Highlights), Center for Survey Research, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg, Virginia, July 2000 at 17, available at http://filebox.vt.edu/centers/survey/qol/highlts.html.
202. Id.
203. See Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, at http://www.vadp.org/21day.hln (last
visited, Sept.16, 2001).
204. Gallup Poll, supra note 61.
205. Id.
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to indicate that while Americans are beginning to question whether the
death penalty, as currently implemented, is the proper punishment for
persons convicted of capital crimes, levels of disapproval are still far
from matching the disapproval indicated in 1972 when the death
penalty was declared unconstitutional.
Although public perception has not yet dropped to levels recorded in
1972, not only is the general public increasingly skeptical about death
penalty implementation, so too are some notable legal experts. In her
July 3, 2001, speech at the annual meeting of Minnesota Women
Lawyers in Minneapolis, Justice O'Connor publicly expressed concerns
about the manner in which the United States is implementing the death
penalty. 206 Specifically, O'Connor questioned whether the punishment is
being administered fairly and whether the performance of trial lawyers is
meeting constitutionally acceptable standards. 207 O'Connor's comments
are interesting both because she is typically a critical swing vote needed
to form a 5-4 majority on a divided court, and because her comments
seem to echo some concerns expressed by the Furman court in 1972,
particularly those about the fairness of its implementation. 20 1 In that
speech, O'Connor noted "If statistics are any indication, the system
may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed. '209
Likewise, in an April 9, 2001, speech at the University of the District of
Columbia, Justice Ginsburg expressed her support for a moratorium on
the death penalty, noting that defendants with good lawyers "do not get
the death penalty. '210
CONCLUSION
As the number of death row inmates executed continues to rise, so too
do concerns abound about the fairness of death penalty implementation
in the United States. In Virginia, Earl Washington, Jr. was granted an
absolute pardon after having twice come within days of execution
because he was unable to introduce DNA evidence that had the potential
to exonerate him. Virginia's 21-day rule violates one of the critical
206. Frank Green, Death Penalty Doubts Arise: 0 'Connor Questions Whether Laws Always Protect
the Innocent, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), July 9, 2001, at Al.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. More Death Penalty Doubts, USA TODAY, July 6,2001, at All.
210. Anne Gearan, The Associated Press, Supreme Court Justice Backs Proposed Death penalty
Freeze in The Record, Apr. 10, 2001, at A18.
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safeguards articulated in Gregg v. Georgia - meaningful appellate
review.211 By limiting the time frame within which potentially
exculpatory evidence can be introduced, the 21-day rule seemed to
propagate arbitrary and capricious implementation of the death penalty
in Virginia, because appellate courts are precluded from examining all
relevant information before upholding the death penalty. In Furman,
the Court recognized limitations in Georgia's sentencing procedures and
issued a moratorium on executions until the legislature could address
those concerns. Recently, at a nationwide level, two sitting Supreme
Court Justices have publicly expressed concern about how the death
penalty is implemented in the United States. In Illinois, thirteen people
on death row were exonerated for their crimes, prompting Governor
George Ryan to issue a moratorium on executions in Illinois pending a
committee review on the flaws of the death penalty system in that
state. 212 In Virginia, Earl Washington, Jr.'s case has highlighted the
problems with Virginia's evidentiary procedures. Although the General
Assembly declined to approve a moratorium on capital punishment
pending further study, the legislators did attempt to respond to critics of
the death penalty by passing legislation that makes evidentiary review
more feasible and establishes higher standards for death penalty counsel.
These attempts at legislative reform target the problems noted by
Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg; however, it is yet to be determined
whether this legislative reform will solve the problems with Virginia's
implementation of the death penalty.
211. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
212. Ken Armstrong and Steve Mills, Ryan: 'Until I Can Be Sure'; Illinois Is First State to Suspend
Death Penalty, CH. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1.
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